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LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS ON PAPER ISSUED AND NEGOTIATED
WITHOUT AUTHORITY BY THEIR EMPLOYEES.
It is generally held that where an officer of a corporation has a
general power to make, accept or indorse negotiable paper for it,
the corporation is bound by his exercise of that power, where the
paper is in the hands of a holder who took bona fide and with-
out knowledge of any wrongful exercise of the employee's power
in the particular instance.' Nor is one deprived of the protection
of a bona fide holder simply because he is negligent or has knowl-
edge of circumstances which would arouse suspicion in the mind
of a more prudent man, provided he acts in good faith.' It is
said, however, that the above can have no application in a case
where the paper, on its face, imports notice that the paper was
issued for the employee's personal benefit, as where it is made
payable to himself individually. 3
'Credit Co. v. Howe Machine Co., 54 Conn., 357; Monument Nar.
Bank v. Globe Works, 101 Mass.. 57.
2 Goodman v. Harvey, 4 Ad. & El. 870; Good-man v. Simonds, 20 How.,
343.
34 Thompson on Corporations, Sec. 4724.
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court in a recent case held that
one who takes the check of a corporation in payment of the per-
sonal debt of its employee is bound to inquire and ascertain if it
has been issued by the company with knowledge of the purpose to
which it is to be applied; and, where he makes no such inquiry,
and the employee was in fact not authorized to so issue the check,
the corporation is not liable thereon.
4
It will be seen that this rule makes the taker assume that the
corporation issued the paper without knowledge of its purpose
and that the man who proposes to deal with it has no right to do
so; and this in the face of any extraneous facts of which the
taker might have knowledge that would be reasonable ground for
a contrary assumption. It is submitted that the law does not re-
quire an intending purchaser of negotiable paper to suspect fraud
and institute inquiry where everything seems fair and honest.5
The rule in the principal case amounts to saying that, under no
circumstances may one receive the corporation's paper from its
employee without making inquiry each time as to whether the cor-
poration has authorized its issue, or knew of the purpose for
which it was issued. No reliance could be placed on knowledge
of former dealing, nor would one be allowed to assume from the
nature of the employee's.employment that he was not in a position
to fraudulently sign or procure the corporation's name to be
signed to the paper. Neither reason nor policy demands a rule so
broad nor do the best considered authorities support it.
A great many decisions, which are cited as supporting the rule,
do not do so, if the decisions are confined strictly to the facts ad-
judicated in the case before the court.
The court in the principal case cites no authority except a for-
mer Rhode Island case,8 where the taker of a note was requested
not to present it for payment until later and he knew at the time
that the corporation had made an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. It was upon this knowledge that the court deprived the
taker of the protection of a bona fide holder.
In Claflin v. The Farmer's Bank7 decided in 1862, the holding
for a year by the plaintiff of two checks payable to the corpora-
tion's president and certified "good" by him, was the main circum-
4 Sheer v. Hall & Lyon Co., 88 AtI., 801.
5 Seybel v. National Currency Bank, 54 N. Y., 288.6 Randall v. Rhode Island Lumber Co., 20 R. ., 625.
725 N. Y., 293.
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stance which disentitled the plaintiff to the protection of a bona
fide holder. Davies and Sutherland, JJ., dissented from the ma-
jority decision.
In West v. The Shawnee Bank,8 the paper showed that the de-
fendant's name had been used as an accommodation indorser, in
which capacity, as a rule, banks have not power to indorse.
In Chemical Bank v. Wagner,' decided in 1892, the plaintiff had
discounted six notes of $20,000 each, payable at four months to
the order of the president. The court cites no authority for its
decision in favor of the defendant.
In Wilson v. Metropolitan R. R. Co.,10 Parker, C. J., stated the
rule essentially as laid down in the principal case, but it was purely
obiter. He allowed the plaintiff to recover there because, if he
had made inquiry, he would have found an apparent authority,
though not an authority in fact. This is a very important limita-
tion on the rule laid down in the princpal case and shows the
tendency to allow a purchaser to act on appearances. Yet the.
later New York cases n general follow the rule stated in that case
by way of dictum and cite it as authority for it.
On the other hand, there are respectable authorities which have
held the other way, making actual bona fides the test of the char-
acter of the holder.
The Supreme of Massachusetts, in 1906, had a case precisely
in point before it." There the defendant held some sixty per-
sonal promisory notes of the corporation's treasurer falling due
one each month, which he regularly paid with checks signed by
himself as treasurer, payable to his own order or to the order of
the payee of his notes. It was held that the money paid on such
notes could not be recovered because the defendant took them
bona fide. It was said that the defendant had a right to believe
from her knowledge of the treasurer's uprightness, as evidenced
by former relations with him, that the money was being with-
drawn lawfully or was so appropriated in payment of his own
salary. The Court said that "even if there might have been some
circumstances which would have raised doubts in the mind of a
more prudent person, the defendant's right to retain the proceeds
of the checks cannot be divested without proof that she knew, or
8 95 U. S., 557.
9 93 Ky., 525.
10 120 N. Y., 145.
11 Fillebrown v. Hafward, 190 Mass., 472.
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in the face of facts sufficient to put her on inquiry, purposely re-
frained from knowing of the fraud of Cable."
In New Jersey, a bank president, Damon, without authority
issued a note to himself for $10,000, which was discounted by
another bank, a statement being presented at the time from one
Hebbard, which showed the bank to be indebted to Damon in a
larger amount than the amount of the note. The court held that
the discounting bank was justified under the circumstances in
relying on the statements of Damon and had a valid charge against
the bank, though as a matter of fact he was unauthorized to make
the note and the bank owed him only $55.12
Another New Jersey case held that where bonds were issued
and properly signed by the mayor and left in his- custody, but
without authority to negotiate, one who took bona fide from him
got a good title. There a recovery was allowed because the holder
was a holder in due course as defined in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law-having no notice at the time it was negotiated to
him on. any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of
the person negotiating it.18
These three decisions are under the Negotiable Instruments
Law and show authority for making the holder's actual bona fides
the test of his rights. Even in the cases which hold the other way,.
the courts seize upon any extraneous knowledge the taker may
have had to deprive him of the character of a bona fide holder
and there seems to be no good reason why the same character of
knowledge should not be allowed to corroborate that bona fide
character which law presumes every holder to have. Because the
rule laid down in the principal case would disallow such, it is sub-
mitted that it is too broad.
IN EXECUTORY CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF LAND, WHAT IS THE
GROUND ON WHICH THE VENDOR, WHO HAS PAID THE TAXES,
CAN RECOVER THEM FROM THE VENDEE IN POSSESSION?
In the case of Miliville Aerie No. 1836, Fraternal Order of
Eagles, v. Weatherby et a., recently decided by the New Jersey
Court of Chancery, the Vice-Chancellor relied chiefly upon author-
ity, and his reasoning was not clearly set forth.1 That he had in
12 Hebberd v. Southwestern Land & Cattle Co., 55 N. J. Eq., 18.
13 Borough of Montvale v. People's Bank, 74 N. J. L., 464.
188 AtI. Rep., 847.
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mind, however, that class of quasi contracts which the law implies
against one man in favor of another who, under compulsion, has
discharged some obligation of the former and thereby enriched
him, is clearly indicated by these words: "Such payments cannot
be regarded as in any sense voluntary." Since the vendor held
the legal title, in other words, he was responsible to the state for
the taxes.2 But how was the vendee rendered liable to the ven-
dor? Eliminating contract and tort, neither of which appeared in
the case, we have left only some obligation implied by law, as sug-
gested above. Two elements of such obligation are clearly pres-
ent-compulsion exerted upon the vendor, and his resulting pay-
ment. But where is the obligation of the vendee, which was dis-
charged by such payment? Clearly he was not bound at law to
pay the taxes to the state. An examination of the cases cited
later in support of his liability, will show that such liability is
confined to his relations with the vendor. As shown above, the
state will look to the holder of the legal title.
Therefore his obligation, if any existed, was equitable. But the
only equitable obligation which could possibly have rested upon
him was to repay to the vendor the taxes assessed upon and paid
by the latter. Strictly speaking, therefore, the only obligation in
the case was the one which the law implied, as far as the vendee
was concerned. This eliminates from our consideration a large
class of quasi contracts, except for a few cases usually included
under the head which we are discussing in the collection of cases
on the subject.3 These are, in general, cases where the plaintiff
under compulsion, at least, of moral duty, or sometimes facing
the alternative of loss to himself, has incurred expense in the
preservation of defendant's property. Such a case was Great
Northern Railway Co. v. Swaffield, where the plaintiff, a carrier,
was compelled by the fault of the consignee and owner, here
defendant, to incur liability for the keep of a horse, in preference
to risking an action by turning it loose.4 Plaintiff had judgment.
rn the Vermont case of Beckwith v. Frisbie, the carrier of oats
had to incur storage charges during transit to prevent a loss, and
collected the amount of these charges from the consignee on de-
livery.5 The consignee then tried to reimburse himself by this
237 Cyc., 788, tit. Taxation.
3 Scott, Cases on Quasi Contracts; Keener, Cases on Quasi Contract.$.
4L. Rep., 9, Exc. 132.
5 32 Vt., 559.
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action, and failed. In both these cases, it will be noted that prop-
erty of the defendant was preserved, and he was thereby en-
riched, while in neither tase did the payment redound to the
advantage of the plaintiff. Therefore, while these decisions seem
as nearly parallel to the principal case as any in the field of quasi
contract, this important distinction is to be observed-that in the
principal case, and in the similar decisions, to be cited later, on
which it was based, the property which was protected was at least
as much that of the vendor, who claimed reimbursement, as of
the vendee, and the former had a valuable interest-that of se-
curity-to be preserved. Hence we cannot pay, in any usual
sense of the term, that the vendee has been enriched through the
vendor's payment. It seems necessary to look to some matter
collateral to the main transaction to discover a justification for
the imposition of this liability.
What reason is there, why in natural justice as between these
two parties, the burden should be borne by the vendee? Is the
court blindly following the analogy of the risk of loss? Clearly
not, for out of the twelve states which make liability for
taxes expressly dependent on possession, two, Pennslvania and
Missouri, 7 expressly hold that possession has nothing to do with
the risk of loss; while three, New Jersey, Georgia, and Wiscon-
sin,8 go part way toward this conclusion, either by adopting with-
out express qualification the rule laid down by Lord Eldon in
Paine v. Meller,9 that the risk is on the vendee from the time of
the bargain, or by inclining, as Georgia and Wisconsin do, toward
the minority view that risk is on the vendor until the date for
conveyance has arrived. Also, not one of these states holds ex-
pressly that possession is a condition precedent to the incidence
of the risk of loss upon the vendee. It is obvious, therefore, that
the burden of taxes is not the inevitable concomitant of the ri~k
of loss.
We are driven to the conclusion that the burden of taxes is
made to accompany possession, because he who receives the
0 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Iowa, Arkansas, eGorgia, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Ohio, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
7 Robb v. Mann, 11 Pa., 300; Manning v. North British Insurance Co.,
123 Mo. App., 456.
sMarion v. Wolcott, 68 N. J. Eq., 20; Phinizy v. Guernsey, 111 Ga.,
346; Wetzler v. Duffy, 78 Wis., 170.
0 6 Ves., 349.
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rents and profits ought, in. natural justice, to bear it. But we
must be careful to distinguish the case of a tenant from that of
one who is the actual and ultimate recipient of the rents and
profits. In the principal case, attention is called to the New Jer-
sey statute which provides that, although the taxes may be levied
against the tenant, he has recourse over against the landlord,
because the latter iT of course the real recipient of the rents and
profits.10 The same rule will be found in Cyc.' 1 Under what cir-
cumstances, then, does the vendee under an executory contract
correspond to a tenant, and when does he enjoy these benefits
exclusively? First, a mere contract for the sale of land, convey-
ance at a future date, does not, in the absence of some express
stipulation, give the vendee the right to possession.12 (These
citations have been confined within the twelve states mentioned
above.6 Four of them hold as above stated, and in the other
eight no decision in point can be found.) When, therefore, we
find the vendee in possession, his presence can be explained or~ly
on the basis of special contract, the consideration for which is
the payment of rent, or some .concession as to the terms of sale,
or on the simple basis of the vendor's generosity. If the first
supposition is true, how does his position differ from that of the
tenant? He has paid for the use of the premises, just as the
tenant has, and if the mere fact that he is to obtain title in the
future ought to render him liable for taxes, why not impose the
same burden on a vendee not in possession? A case exactly illus-
trating this point was that of Clinton v. Shugart, decided in
Iowa. s3  Here the vendee under an executory contract was in
possession as a tenant under lease, the date for conveyance being
set at the end of the term, and the vendor was held liable for the
taxes.
Where the vendee's possession is a pure gratuity, however, and
he receives the rents and profits without paying a consideration,
there is some basis in natural justice for making him pay the tax.
It is submitted, however, that for a court to imply an obligation
against one man in favor of another, simply because the latter
has on a previous occasion given the former a present, is quite
unique in the field of quasi contract.
10 P. L., 1903, p. 424, s. 46.
1124 Cyc., 1074, and cases cited.
12 Druse v. Wheeler, 22 Mich., 439; Doe v. Roe, 39 Ga., 91; Du BoiL
v. Baum, 46 Pa., 537; Prendergast v. Burlington R. R. Co., 53 Iowa, 326.
18 126 Iowa, 179.
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STERILIZATION .OF CRIMINALS.
In the recent case of Smith v. Board of Examiners of the
Feeble Minded, 88 Atl., 963 (N. J.), there was drawn in question
the constitutionality of a statute which authorized a board of ex-
aminers to inquire into the condition of the feeble minded, epi-
leptic, certain criminal and other defective inmates confined in
the several reformatories, charitable and penal institutions of the
counties and state, and that, upon deciding unanimously, in con-
junction with the chief physician of the institution, that pro-
creation by such inmates was inadvisable, and no improvement
being probable so that procreation might afterwards become ad-
visable, it should be lawful for the said board to authorize such
operation for the prevention of procreation as it considered ef-
fective, and thereupon for a surgeon, under the direction of the
chief physician of such institution, to perform such operation.
The court, while stating that it recognized the underlying ques-
tion of whether the state is justified in the theoretical betterment
of society by the sterilization of its undesirable members, did not
decide that matter, but held that the statute was unconstitutional,
in that, first having created two classes of persons, i. e., those
within and without the said institutions, it then applied the rem-
edy to the class to which it had the least and not the sole applica-
tion, and the class so affected bore no reasonable relation to the
object of the regulation, and that thus it denied to the individuals
of the class the equal protection of the laws. This caused a vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This decision appears to be correct. By the police power of
the states persons and property are-subjected to all kinds of re-
straints and burdens, within constitutional limitations, in order
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state
as a whole.'
Again, the public policy of a state is determined by itself and
is subject to no control from without unless it contravenes the
Federal Constitution or some treaty or statute conformable there-
to,2 and the general rule is that the Fourteenth Amendment does
1Redfield, C. 3., in Thorpe v. Burlington & Rutldnd R. R. Co., 27 Vt.,
140. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Turberville v. Stampe, 1 Ld.
Raym., 764; Pixley v. Clark, 35 N. Y., 520.
2 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. R. Co., 175 U. S.,
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not withhold from the states the power of classification if the
statute in question d.eals with all of a certain class alike3 and the
classification is reasonable.
Yet the classification must not be arbitrary,4 and must always
rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable relation to
the act in respect to which the classification is proposed. So
when the question of the power of a state to classify for the pur-
pose of taxation was presented to the Supreme Court, -Mr. Jus-
tice Bradley said: "All such regulations, and those of like char-
acter, as long as they proceed within reasonable limits, are within
the discretion of the legislature; but clear and hostile discrimina-
tion against particular persons and classes, especially such as are
of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of our govern-
ments, might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition. '
The case under discussion falls directly within the latter part
of this statement. Here the legislature has provided a remedy
for those individuals of a class who happen to be under its care,
and who, indeed, have no opportunity for reproduction, and ex-
cepted the larger portion of the class who are at liberty, and free
to people the world with progeny. A more unreasonable classi-
fication could scarcely be imagined.
With the wisdom or policy of such legislation the courts have
no concern. Those are matters of which the legislature is the
sole judge.7 Nevertheless it may not be improper to consider for
a moment the practical workings of these laws. The legislatures
of seven states have passed statutes similar in many respects to
that of New Jersey.8 What will be the effect? As tending to the
betterment of the race, this action of the states would seem much
too hasty. It is not even admitted by any means universally that
the children of criminals, etc., are necessarily of an inferior type.
There is still a grave dispute among medical authorities as to
3 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S., 68; St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v.
Mathews, 165 U. S., 1; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S., 657.
4 Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg., 200; Debrell v. Morris's Heirs, 1"5 S. W.,
87; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo., 307; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356.
5 Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U. S., 150.
6 Bell Gap R. R. Co. v. Pa., 134 U. S., 237.
7 Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal., 370; Baxter v. Tripp, 12 R. I., 310; People
v. Gillson, 109 N. Y., 389; Townsend v. State, 147 Ind., 624.
8 Laws, N. Y., ch. 445, 1911; Laws, Wash., 1909, ch. 249, s. 35; Ind., ch.
215, 1907; Conn. Laws, 1909, ch. 209; Iowa, 1911, ch. 129; Cal., 1909, ch.
720.
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whether the development of certain traits in an individual is to be
attributed to inherited tendencies or merely to the law of atavism.
Therefore, until this question is settled beyond reasonable doubt
the zeal of these legislatures considerably outruns their discre-
tion.
As to the prevention of rape, the remedy is singularly ineffec-
tive. To quote a work of recognized authority, "it removes about
the only existing deterrent, namely the dangers attending the
gratification of such immoral desires". 10 The subject is as capa-
ble of performing the acts which constitute the crime of rape as
before.
"What is the essence of the crime of rape? Dishonor by vio-
lence, not by impregnation. Is a woman dishonored by a forcible
entry of her person? This has never been doubted in any coun-
try in Europe.""' Yet the statutes do nothing in providing such
a remedy to protect women from this crime.
The real point of interest, from a legal standpoint in statutes
of this kind is whether such operations as are thus permitted to
be performed on criminals are to be regarded as a "cruel and
unusual punishment" within the meaning of the prohibition in
the Federal and State Constitutions. The clause in the Constitu-
tion of the United States embodying such prohibition has been
held to be no restraint on the states, 12 but the Constitutions of
most of the states include the same provision' s
It has been said that whether a given punishment is cruel and
unusual or not depends in each case upon the act to be punished
and the particular punishment.' 4  It may be safely asserted that
physical torture or such acts as would shock the feelings of ordi-
nary persons would never be permitted as a punishment, no mat-
ter how horrid the crime.15 The constitutional prohibition, more-
over, seems, according to the general opinion, to refer solely to
9 See Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 321
and 326.
10 41 L. R. A., 419, note.
11 Robertson's Case, 1 Swint., 93.
12Pervear v. Con., 5 Wall., 475; O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U. S., 323.
13N. J. Const., Art. I, sec. 15; Ind. Const., Art. 1, par. 61; N. H. Const..
Part I, Art. 33; Tex. Const., Art. I., sec. 13.
14 Blydenberg v. Miles, 39 Conn., 484; State v. Stubblefield, 157 Mo.,
360.
W, Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S., 130; Hobbs v. State, 133 Ind., 404.
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such punishments as disgraced the civilization of former ages' 6
as, for instance, boiling in oil, quartering, hanging in chains,
burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and other barbarous
inflictions.17
Judge Cooley defines the clause as including "what public sen-
timent has condemned as cruel or such punishments as those
which, if ever employed at all, have become unusual." 18 It must
also, of necessity, include any new forms of punishment which
would be repugnant to our sense of justice now, as well as the
old atrocities, sanctioned under the common law.
We may accept the rule, in effect, that the punishment should
be proportioned to the offense.' 9 Let us consider the crime for
which this operation is usually prescribed as a penalty and the
exact nature of the operation itself, together with its results. So
far the crime thus punished has been that of rape. No one
will deny its heinous nature. The operation is known as
"vasectomy". It is considered in the medical profession an
"office operation", painlessly performed in a few moments. The
patient suffers no inconvenience and is not impaired for the pur-
suits of life except that he is effectually sterilized.2 0
The only adjudicated case on'this subject is that of State v.
Feiler, decided in Washington during 1912."1 There the statute
provided that "whenever any person shall be adjudged guilty of
a carnal abuse of a -female under ten years, or of rape, or shall
be adjudged to be an habitual criminal, this operation (vasec-
tomy) may be directed to be performed." 22
A unanimous court held- this not to be a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, saying that it did not appear that any marked degree of
physical pain was suffered; that, since death might have -been
made a punishment for the offense, any lesser degree of punish-
ment, unaccompanied by physical torture, was permissible, and
that they would not disturb the discretion of the legislature ex-
cept in extreme cases.
16 Whitten v. Georgia, 57 Ga., 297.
17 State v. Woodward, 68 W. Va., 66; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S., 436;
Wilkerson v. Utah, supra.
38 Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 473.
19 Weems v. United States, 217 U. S., 349; Blacks., Vol. 4, 92, 327, 377.
20 Medico-Legal Journal, Vol 27, p. 34.
2170 Wash., 65.
22 Rem. and Bal. Code, Wash., par. 2287.
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From this conclusion we respectfully dissent. It may be all
very well, whether or not it be c6nceded that sterilization is neces-
sary to prevent the propagation of inferior children, to take such
measures towards habitual criminals, though it might be sug-
gested that it is rather difficult to determine who is an habitual
criminal.
Nevertheless, to take from one who has committed the crime
of rape but once, all hope of future progeny, when he may go
forth from confinement, at some future time a reformed man,
seems as cruel and unusual a punishment as can well be conceived
of. It is a punishment which lasts beyond his term of imprison-
ment, even to the grave.23
LIMITATION OF ACTION AGAINST SURETY ON OFFICIAL BOND.
In the case of The City, of Butte v. Goodwin et al.,' which was
an action commenced in May, 1911, against a former city treas-
urer, who held office from May, 1905, to May, 1907, and the
sureties on his official bond, to recover money earned as interest
by the city funds during his term of office and retained by him,
three statutes of limitation were involved; and it was held that
the cause of action was not one arising out of contract in the strict
sense of the word, nor one based upon a liability created by stat-
ute, but one "upon an obligation or liability, not founded upon
an instrument in writing, other than contract," and was barred
because it was not commenced within three years, as provided by
statute. The period of the statute applicable to actions on bonds
was eight years.
In arriving at this conclusion the court decided that the city
treasurer, who was not an insurer of the public funds, was a
trustee, in point of law, of the funds for the ust: of the city and
accountable for and under an obligation to pay over any profits
derived from the use of the trust funds, on a quasi-contractual
basis; and that a breach of such obligation constituted a breach
of his official bond. But the court further said that there was
a breach of the obligation of the bond only because the treasurer
"was guilty of a breach of his implied promisd to pay over" the
23But see an article by Governor Simeon E. Baldwin in 8 Yale Law
Journal, 371.
1 134 Pacific Reporter (Mont.), 670.
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interest; "it is this breach of his obligation or legal duty which
gives rise to a cause of action. * * * The duty was imposed by law
and was not affected in the least by the giving of the bond. * * *
If the city has a cause of action against Goodwin, it arises from
his wrongful act in retaining money which belonged to the city
* * and not upon the violation of any express contract."
Although the language of the court is ambiguous, it was prob-
ably intended to adopt the holding of the California court in the
case of Sonoma County v. Hall,2 which is cited. There, an action
on an official bond of a county recorder was held to be barred by
the statute of limitations which barred a quasi-contractual action
against the recorder for breach of his official duty on the ground
that when the primary obligation of the officer is barred or in
any legal way extinguished, the sureties are relieved in like man-
ner as a guarantor upon a written guaranty to answer for the debt
of another would be relieved, when the primary obligation of the
principal debfor is barred or extinguished, notwithstanding the
written contract. That case is not only opposed to the weight of
authority,3 but the analogy attempted in it stands upon the false
premise that the quasi-contractual obligation of the recorder was
his primary obligation under the bond.
It is admitted that when the city treasurer failed to turn over
to his successor in office the entire amount of the funds of the
city entrusted to him, together with the earnings of such funds
in the way of interest, he was guilty of a breach of the obligation
of his official bond.4 Immediately, principal and sureties became
liable upon that bond and that liability continued until barred by
the statute of limitations applicable to the case or until otherwise
legally extinguished.
Undoubtedly the treasurer would have been iiable on the basis
of quasi-contract had there been no bond and would have been
liable, on that basis, if the amount of his defalcation had ex-
ceeded the amount of the bond, to the extent of such excess;
however, the fact that there was a bond, made it no longer neces-
sary to resort to a fiction of law to secure the city in its right to
its funds within the amount of the bond. Quoting from the dis-
senting opinion: "That instrument contains the express stipula-
tion on the part of Goodwin and his sureties that he shall pay
2132 Cal., 589.
3 See Ames Cases on Suretyship, 131 et seq.; Childs on Suretyship, 239.
4 See Brandt on Suretyship and Guaranty, 2d ed., 534.
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over and faithfully account for all moneys coming into his hands
belonging to the city. If he has not done this, I cannot under-
stand how it can be that this express stipulation has not been vio-
lated, or why that violation is not the basis of his and their lia-
bility. * * * Implication may be necessary to the conclusion that
the interest belonged to the city; but that the promise of Good-
win to pay over and faithfully account for the city's money is a
pure fiction of law, I cannot believe. * * * The concept of duty
is undoubtedly back of Goodwin's liability, as it may fairly be
said to be 'the root' of all liability whatsoever. Breach of duty in
some form is a necessary ingredient of every case; but that does
not alter the fact that, when the duty is formally expressed by
written instrument, causes of action may be. and often are
founded, within the meaning of the statute of limitations, upon
the instrument, even though no legal necessity existed for the
execution of it."
The contract of a surety is undoubtedly a collateral engagement
for another, as distinguished from an original and direct agree-
ment for the party's own act, and there can be no liability of the
surety without an original liability of the principal;5 but because
that is so it does not follow that the obligation of the principal as
a party to the bond is collateral in the sense that it is made to
depend upon what would have been his liability in the absence
of the written instrument. Suppose the case of a wife living
apart from her husband through the fault of the latter, who
nevertheless contracts in writing with a merchant to pay the mar-
ket value-of such necessaries as the latter may furnish her; in the
event of failure on the part of the husband to live up to his con-
tract, would not the statue of limitations applicable to actions on
contract apply, and not that applicable to quasi-contractual
actions, although the husband was under a quasi-contractual duty
to pay for necessaries furnished his wife ?6 "If Goodwin was re-
quired to and did execute the bond, this action * * * is not barred
as to him. If his liability endures, that of the sureties endures
also." The bond was given for the purpose of making the city
more secure, and possibly even to secure the benefit of the longer
period of limitation; and the giving of the bond was a condition
precedent to the treasurer's entrance upon the duties of his office.
Eisinq v. Andrews, 66 Conn., 58.
' Hunt v. Hayes, 64 Vt., 89.
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To separate the liability of the treasurer as principal under the
bond from his quasi-contractual liability and hold that the latter
should alone be considered, whereas the obvious intention was
that it should be superseded by the former, is to defeat the very
purpose of the bond. The holding of the Montana court was
dearly erroneous.
